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The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania:
A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939
DRAGAN BAKIC´
After the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous
enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic
neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This
analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian
policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost
importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in
the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in
Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive south-
ern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian
interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania
with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards:
it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial
ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers,
however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a
major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav
support; but he then turned to Rome, which was more capable of
and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the
Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a num-
ber of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would
put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more
efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check.
Constant tension and crises between newly created Yugoslavia and Italy, a
Great Power bent on exercising dominant influence in the Danube region
and the Balkans, were permanent sources of instability for interwar Europe.
The seeds of discord were planted during the First World War when the
Entente Powers induced Italy to join their coalition with the secret 26 April
1915 Treaty of London. In the Balkans, Italy was to be rewarded with a
large slice of Croat-populated Dalmatia on the eastern coast of Adriatic—
once ruled by Venice; it would also have a share of and exclusive influence
in the rest of Albania, save the northern regions divided between Serbia and
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Montenegro and those in the south attached to Greece. The loss of these
spoils in the Adriatic after the war formed part of the resentment to which
the Italians referred as victoria mutilata and set the tone for a virulent enmity
towards Yugoslavia. Moreover, Rome perceived Yugoslavia, along with
Romania and Czechoslovakia with which it concluded the anti-Hungarian
Little Entente in 1920–1921, as a client state of France. Whereas Paris nurtured
associations with the anti-revisionist successor states of Austria–Hungary to
guarantee the permanence of the Paris Peace Settlement, Italian ambitions
in the Danube and Balkan region necessitated a break-up of the French sys-
tem. A neighbouring and the militarily strongest Power in the Little Entente,
Yugoslavia was central after 1922 to Benito Mussolini’s, the Italian dictator’s,
strategy in a trial of strength with France in South-Eastern Europe. For that
reason, the local rivalry over Albania sometimes had a wider impact on the
relations amongst the Great Powers.
Given the considerable contemporary prominence and significance of
the Italo–Yugoslav confrontation over Albania, it is surprising that only a
few comprehensive analyses exist providing a rather broad survey of the
topic.1 One short study does cover the interwar relations between Belgrade
and Tirana in which Italian factor inevitably features heavily.2 And the same
can be said of an excellent monograph that details those relations during
the crucial period of the mid-1920s.3 The conflict over Albania is naturally
touched upon in studies focussing on Italo–Yugoslav relations or Yugoslav
foreign policy in general.4 This exegesis, however, outlines and analyses
how Yugoslavia viewed the problem of Italian penetration and the eventual
possession of Albanian territory during the interwar period, the main con-
siderations determining its strategic security requirements, and the policies
adopted to protect its interests.
During the Paris Peace Conference, Albania was always treated in con-
nexion with the entire Adriatic and, for that reason, the head of the Yugoslav
delegation at Paris, Nikola Pašic´, referred to it as “the object of compensa-
tion.”5 It could have hardly been otherwise since Italian troops had occupied
a large part of Dalmatia and most of Albania on the basis of an inter-Allied
military agreement. The Serbian Army seized the town of Shkodra but had
to evacuate it under Allied duress.6 It took positions in Northern Albania
to the Drin River whilst the French controlled a small tract of land around
the town of Korca in the south of the country. The Yugoslav government
firmly believed it a matter of vital importance not to allow Italy to acquire
full sovereignty over the port of Valona and its hinterland and secure com-
plete control over the rest of Albania. Italian money, arms, and propaganda
fostered turmoil deep in Yugoslav territory, in the provinces with consider-
able Albanian population—Kosovo, Metohija, and Macedonia—as well as in
Montenegro amongst the supporters of the former king, Nikola I Petrovic´.7
In particular, Rome’s support of subversive activities against Yugoslavia cen-
tred on the irredentist Kosovo Committee founded in Shkodra in November
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1918, which equally employed propaganda and violence for the creation of
a pan-Albanian state.8 From the strategic point of view, the Yugoslavs were
also frightened of the peril of Italians “joining hands” from Albania with the
Bulgarians across the Vardar Valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cutting off the
vital Belgrade–Salonica railway as the Bulgarian Army had done in 1915.9
Belgrade’s stance on the Albanian question was formed accordingly. Under
the slogan “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples,” the Yugoslav delegation
in Paris plumped for the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers as
sketched by the London Conference after the First Balkan War. If the Great
Powers had rendered that independence impossible, the delegates would
have fallen back on a reserve policy—absorption of the northern parts as far
as the Drin River to gain a strategically more viable border.10
In their proposal of 14 January 1920, Georges Clemenceau, the French
premier, and David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, presented an
ultimatum to the Yugoslavs: consent to generous territorial gain in Albania
or face the integral execution of the Treaty of London.11 Lacking any clear-
cut instructions from the government, Yugoslav delegates proved reluctant
to reach a decision. In addition, they were divided as to the best course
of action. It should be noted that Pašic´—the only head of a major delega-
tion not a prime minister or president—strongly argued for accepting of the
Entente’s offer.12 He urged the Cabinet in Belgrade to realise that Italy would
be allowed to set its foot firmly in central Albania and that “we have to
demand different and better frontiers in the direction of the Albanian territo-
ries which would fall under Italian protectorate.”13 Pašic´ laid down minimum
requirements that included the territory up to the Drin River and a maximum
request stretching to the Mati River to reduce as much as possible the extent
of an Italian protectorate. A later and anonymous account of the Albanian
question in Yugoslav foreign policy that showed decided familiarity with
the topic explicitly stated that Pašic´ “exerted great efforts to stay in Skadar
[Shkodra] in the utmost secrecy and isolated from the other members of the
government.”14 Pašic´ was a political pragmatist, not averse to accepting what
he deemed to be political realities. In the end, the Yugoslav delegation gave
an evasive reply to the Anglo–French proposal,15 which was finally nipped
in the bud by the American president, Woodrow Wilson, as contemptuous
of national self-determination.
Pašic´ insisted that the most active policy be pursued by winning over
local Albanians to follow Yugoslavia’s lead rather than that of Italy, for
which no effort and expense be spared. His suggestions were accepted
by Ljubomir Davidovic´’s Cabinet, and the special Albanian section of the
Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, also known as the Fourth sec-
tion, was formed in August 1919 under direct control of the prime minister to
oversee and co-ordinate policy towards Albania.16 The Italo–Yugoslav feud
lost its intensity during summer 1920 when rebellious Albanian tribesmen
drove Italian forces out of the country. The government in Tirana then turned
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its attention to expelling Yugoslav troops from the territory allotted to Albania
in 1913. This led to armed clashes in which Albanian forces had initial suc-
cess but were then overrun; the Yugoslav Army moved its positions beyond
the demarcation line held since the war.17 Tirana took the initiative to have
the League of Nations recognise its independence and, consequently, obtain
the withdrawal of foreign troops from its soil.
In 1921, Pašic´ became prime minister—as well as foreign minister—
and endeavoured to ensure diplomatic support for changing the border
in favour of Yugoslavia. On his instructions, the Yugoslav delegate at the
Conference of Ambassadors in Paris explained at length to his French col-
league, Jules Laroche, the under-secretary at the Quai d’Orsay and an expert
in Albanian matters, Yugoslavia’s need for a secure frontier with Albania—the
Conference was a permanent organisation of the Allied ambassadors at Paris
charged with the execution of the peace. Laroche claimed, however, that
any substantial changes in the status quo were impossible; he reminded the
Yugoslavs of the great opportunity lost at the Peace Conference when what
he termed the “French project” had been seized on by Pašic´ but declined by
the Belgrade government.18 It was later claimed that “Pašic´ [had] conducted
negotiations with the Italians in July 1921 and agreed on the division of
Albania between us and Italy under condition that we got a more favourable
solution than that envisaged by the Treaty of London.”19 Pašic´ continued
to hanker for an opportunity to obtain the northern parts of that coun-
try despite the attitude taken at the Peace Conference against his wishes.
In his view, acquiring northern Albania in agreement with Rome would
improve Yugoslavia’s strategic position to keep Italian aggressive designs
in the Balkans in check. His idea constituted a second strand of Yugoslav
thinking regarding Italian danger in Albania, which would persist throughout
the interwar period amongst a number of political and military officials but
never swayed the Belgrade government.
If an Italian agreement proved elusive, Pašic´ looked to create a
favourable situation for Yugoslavia’s interests on the ground. For that pur-
pose, he supported the Mirditi tribe, which occupied a strategically important
curve along the Drin River in their rebellion against the Tirana govern-
ment.20 The Yugoslav Army even took some strategically important positions
in Northern Albania, but this military action brought about the intervention
of Great Powers as well as resignation of four cabinet members, a clear
indication that Pašic´’s Albanian policy met with strong opposition in gov-
ernmental circles.21 The situation was aggravated in October 1921 with the
re-emergence of fighting between the Yugoslav Army and the Albanians
along the demarcation line.22 Italy used the odium created against Belgrade
and diplomatically regained some lost ground. On 9 November 1921, the
Conference of Ambassadors reaffirmed Albania’s 1913 borders, notwith-
standing some minor rectifications, and adopted a resolution subject to
League approval providing for an Italian mandate in Albania to protect its
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independence if threatened. On 20 December 1921, Albania was admitted to
the League and the Yugoslav delegate voted for its admission. In retrospect,
an analysis by the Foreign Ministry’s Albanian section justified Yugoslavia’s
vote and underscored that involvement in Albanian affairs had always been
envisaged “as a counteraction against the goals or presumed goals of Italy
in Albania, i.e., the Balkans.”23 However, after international recognition of
Albania as an independent state, Yugoslavia found itself in an untenable
situation. Britain, in particular, exerted pressure that culminated with Lloyd
George’s initiative to convene an urgent meeting of the League Council and
impose sanctions against Yugoslavia if it refused to order its troops out of
Albania. In the wake of the Council’s session, Belgrade withdrew all armed
forces from that country.
In the chaotic conditions prevailing during the fighting in 1921 in
Albania, Ahmed Zogu, one of the country’s more prominent political fig-
ures, successfully approached Yugoslav authorities to support his take-over
of the government in Tirana.24 Despite his youth, he was already well known
to Yugoslav officials. As the chieftain of the Mati tribe, his first contact with
Serbia occurred in 1915 when he met Pašic´ at Niš; in return for Belgrade’s
political and material help, he promised Mati loyalty at the time when Serbia
was engaged in mortal combat with Austria–Hungary. At Niš, Zogu proved
to be a man of considerable ambition and political skill. He pointed out that
his friendship would be more valuable to Serbia than that of his relation,
Essad-pasha Toptani, who had been and remained until his murder in June
1920 the fulcrum of Serbian influence in Albania. Although Pašic´’s reply was
not recorded, he was reported to have said that Zogu was “a rarely cun-
ning man, who has to be counted with and whose biography should be
completed with the most detailed information.”25 This assessment proved
prophetic: Albania’s existence during the interwar era would for the most
part hinge on Zogu.
Following the overture made in 1921, Pašic´ set great store by co-
operation with Zogu and sent his personal envoy, Nastas Ilic´, to meet him
in Shkodra.26 Due to the rapid development of events in Albania, Ilic´ did
not have the opportunity to see Zogu before the latter became the minis-
ter of Interior Affairs in a newly formed nationalist cabinet. Having studied
the situation on the ground for more than a month, Ilic´ assured Pašic´ that
the nationalist government was a strong guarantee for precluding Italian
intrigues in the country. He argued that Yugoslavia should help consolida-
tion of an orderly Albanian government by recognising the current regime
and sending an official representative to Tirana. It would also go a long
way towards paralysing future Italian action given that Italian supporters in
Albania considered the nationalists to be a pro-Serbian party.27
At this point, it seemed that Pašic´ backed the right pretender in
the Albanian turmoil and that his policy was about to pay dividends.
Moreover, he had very ambitious plans for the future: Zogu consented to
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an Albanian–Yugoslav customs union, promised all sorts of economic advan-
tages for Yugoslavia, a concession for building a railway connecting Yugoslav
territory to the Adriatic, and even talked about military alliance.28 For
Belgrade, it was a renewed attempt to clinch the most favourable agreement
with Albania on the pattern of those concluded with the late Essad-pasha
during the war.29 In return for his adherence to this wide-ranging program of
political and economic rapprochement, Zogu received the requested “moral
and material help.” The Yugoslav government heeded the advice of Ilic´ and
decided to extend recognition to Zogu, though subject to his good will efforts
completing the delimitation between the two countries, suppressing the pro-
paganda of the anti-Yugoslav Kosovo Committee, and expelling its members
from Albania—the same suppression of its activities was requested respecting
the pro-Bulgarian Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organisation (IMRO).
Zogu readily accepted these conditions.30
But Italy could not be ignored. On 27 January 1924, Yugoslavia and Italy
concluded a friendship treaty, the Pact of Rome, signed three days after the
Franco–Czechoslovak friendship agreement.31 The Italian ambitions centred
on disrupting the Little Entente. The Pact sanctioned Italian de facto pos-
session of Fiume in the northern Adriatic and pre-empted the conclusion
of a formal agreement between Paris and Belgrade. In return, Rome agreed
not to interfere in Balkans politics to Yugoslavia’s detriment; that commit-
ment took shape in an obligation to support Yugoslavia diplomatically in the
event of massive armed conflict with Macedonian irregulars. There was even
some prospect that Albania might cease being contested ground between
the two Powers, although that question was not mentioned in the text of the
Pact. However, its very existence and spirit was implicitly assumed to ensure
refraining from a forward policy that could spur further trouble. It was not
to be: “Neither Rome nor Belgrade could resist the intrigues and requests
of their Albanian ‘friends’ who asked for help in order to stay in or come
to power, and promised loyalty and cooperation only to change direction
at the first opportunity.”32 Nonetheless, subsequent Italo–Yugoslav activities
comprised nurturing existing friends and winning over new ones, primarily
by the extensive distribution of money, intriguing in questions pertaining
to Albanian internal policy, prodding chronic blood feuds or calming them
down as necessary, and providing havens for political émigrés who could be
used at any given moment.33
The rift between Yugoslavia and Italy became apparent after the swift
succession of two revolutions in Albania. The first saw the pro-Italian bishop,
Fan-Noli, overthrow Zogu in June 1924. Fan Noli’s government included
Hasan Prishtina and Bajram Curri, leaders of the Kosovo Committee, and
was thus deeply distasteful to Belgrade. Yugoslav intelligence managed to
recruit two of Prishtina’s close associates, who confirmed many reports
of co-operation between the Kosovo Committee and the terrorist IMRO
active in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia.34 Following Zogu’s overthrow, the
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Yugoslavs continued subsidising him and facilitated the re-grouping and arm-
ing of his supporters in Yugoslav territory as well as in Albania.35 In spring
1924, Zogu met Pašic´ in Belgrade. Zogu gave assurances, not confirmed in a
written document, that in returning to power, he would be accommodating
in resolving two minor frontier disputes, dissolve the Kosovo Committee,
resolve the status of the Albanian Orthodox Church in agreement with the
Serbian Orthodox Church, and settle some other less pressing issues.36 The
second revolution, carefully orchestrated from Belgrade, began with Zogu’s
armed incursion into Albania. Due mostly to the excellent intelligence work
of Milosav Jelic´, the ground was prepared in Albania whereby influential
chieftains pledged their support or at least, neutrality to the impending incur-
sion. In addition, when the situation became critical during the action itself,
Jelic´ took command of Zogu’s men and even persuaded a commander of one
Yugoslav Army garrison near the border to send some troops that helped him
decisively to defeat Albanian government forces.37
What at first appeared to have been a clear victory for Yugoslav foreign
policy soon proved a false hope. In January 1925, Zogu formed his sec-
ond government and was elected president of the newly founded Republic.
As promised in Belgrade, he disbanded the Kosovo Committee—Prishtina
left Albania and hid amongst the IMRO in Salonica. The most pressing mat-
ter in stabilising Zogu’s regime, however, was funding its administration and
equipping its armed forces. Both tasks were impossible without significant
external financial support. Belgrade faced ever increasing requests for money
from Tirana that could hardly be met. The Foreign Ministry’s discretionary
funds had been depleted by previous expenses, whereas the Army set its
face against supplying Albania with weapons that might potentially be turned
against the Yugoslavs themselves.38
Despite Zogu’s return to power, Albania remained an unstable politi-
cal entity. Pašic´ never lost sight of its turbulent nature or wavered in his
view that “it should constantly be endeavoured to strengthen Yugoslav
influence primarily in Northern Albania and that that region was politi-
cally most favourable for us for the purpose of counterattacking Italian
actions in Albania.”39 He instructed diplomatic personnel destined for Tirana
about what was wanted: “an independent Albania, but weak and unsettled
Albania.”40 On the other hand, the prospect of making a deal with Rome
over Albania remained a possibility—feelers for such an arrangement came
from Italian side. “During our negotiations with the Italians in 1924, the
Italian Under-Secretary for foreign affairs, [Salvatore] Contarini, dangled the
prospect of the division of Albania, or at least the division of spheres of
interest between our country and Italy,” a later retrospective recorded.41 He
professed to consider Albania the most sensitive point in Italo–Yugoslav rela-
tions, the solution of which would usher in an era of peace and friendship.
The last attempts to find some sort of arrangement took place in 1926 but,
again, nothing materialised.42 According to Živojin Balugdžic´, the minister at
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Rome, a draft agreement with Italy that year contained a handwritten note
that Albania be partitioned between Italy and Yugoslavia in case its inde-
pendence could not be maintained.43 The report on conversations between
Momcˇilo Nincˇic´, the Yugoslav foreign minister, and Contarini and Mussolini
held in Rome showed that the Italians doubted the ability of Albania to
exist as an independent state; however, it is unlikely that discussions on
Albania had much importance on this occasion, since the negotiations were
concerned with the major questions of relations and treaty-making amongst
Yugoslavia, Italy, and France.44 Nincˇic´ proposed a parallel conclusion of
identical Franco–Yugoslav and Italo–Yugoslav treaties or a trilateral agree-
ment to settle finally their relations and stabilise the Balkans; Mussolini would
have none of it—he wanted to exclude the French from what he saw as
Italy’s domain. Nincˇic´ then initialled an agreement with the French foreign
minister, Aristide Briand, who insisted that formal signature be postponed so
as not to wound Italian susceptibilities and keep the door open for Mussolini
to change his mind. In the wake of the Locarno accords of October 1925,
which had made Italy, along with Britain, a guarantor of French security
on the Rhine, France exercised utmost caution in its relations with its Latin
sister.45
Since Yugoslavia could not secure sufficient funds to prop up the
bankrupt Albanian exchequer, Rome seized the opportunity to regain its lost
position. An Italian concern, Societá per lo Sviluppo Economico de l’Albania,
granted a loan amounting to 50F million gold and facilitated the creation of
the National Bank of Albania in 1925. This effort was just the beginning of
Italy’s steady economic subversion of Albania’s administration, Army, and
natural resources that would essentially undermine the country’s indepen-
dence.46 Some Yugoslav representatives in the field grasped the problem.
It was not long before the Yugoslav military attaché at Tirana, Lieutenant-
Colonel Tanasije Dinic´, reported to the Great General Staff that Zogu had
transferred his and his country’s allegiance to Italy in return for generous
financial support.47
An additional difficulty for Yugoslav policy towards Albania was its
inherent weakness. As early as June 1923, an Army Ministry analysis pointed
out the lack of a definite and co-ordinated policy since every clerk seemed
to have pursued a policy of their own.48 Jelic´ also deplored the lack of
co-ordination and went as far as speaking of “three policies” towards that
country—“the first one is conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
second by the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the third by the Ministry
of Army.”49 Not surprisingly, this divergent and disconcerting direction of
affairs could not fail to produce serious problems and the most unfortunate
consequences. Another unknown operative later confirmed Jelic´’s claim by
recalling that for the most part Yugoslav intelligence failures were caused
by the intolerance and mutual intrigues of the services of the Interior Affairs
Ministry, the Army, and sometimes the Foreign Ministry.50
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In addition, a fundamental difference of opinion existed about the atti-
tude to be taken towards Zogu between the minister in Tirana, Branko
Lazarevic´, and other Yugoslav diplomatic and military personal stationed in
Albania during the crucial initial period of Zogu’s regime when its future
orientation lay in the balance. Lazarevic´ suffered from blind confidence
in the Albanian leader to such an extent that he undermined Yugoslav
“friends” in touch with and supported by Yugoslav agents to counter-act any
anti-Yugoslav actions of the Tirana government. The most important, Cena-
beg, bitterly complained to Vojislav Marinkovic´, foreign minister after April
1927, about Lazarevic´’s activities and threatened to withdraw his support for
Belgrade if the minister remained in his post.51 Dinic´ argued vehemently
that Lazarevic´ was causing immense damage to Yugoslav interests and even
hinted at the latter’s personal motives for refusing to admit his failure. Dinic´’s
bitterness was so great that he requested to be removed from his post if there
was no change at the head of the Legation.52 He was not the first or only
one disillusioned with Zogu’s attitude towards Yugoslavia. Reflecting on pre-
vious experience, the secretary of the Tirana Legation, Milovan Prodanovic´,
deemed the president “our greatest enemy in Albania.” Furthermore, he con-
cluded, a strong Albania would be a centre of intrigues against Yugoslavia
and that “all our interest is to help the separatism of the northern tribes.”53
In November 1926, armed rebellion erupted in the Dukadjin region and
took Belgrade by surprise. Both the preliminary report from the field and
a later Foreign Ministry analysis showed that the Italians skilfully exploited
this event, presenting it as a Yugoslav undertaking and frightening Zogu into
aligning with Rome.54 The Albanian government also knew that some mili-
tary preparations for subversive action were underway around the Yugoslav
towns of Djakovica and Prizren.55 It indicated that the military, having
reached the conclusion that Zogu was irreversibly committed to the Italians,
was prone to planning undercover operations to overthrow him behind the
back of the Foreign Ministry.
As early as August 1925, a secret military accord was concluded between
Italy and Albania by which Rome pledged to support Albanian territorial
ambitions at Yugoslav expense.56 It exemplified Zogu’s double-dealing tac-
tics as, at the same time, he complained to Belgrade about being isolated and
abandoned; he asked to join the Little Entente or conclude a secret treaty
with Yugoslavia.57 Prior to the Dukadjin rebellion, the Yugoslavs received
their first reports on the forthcoming conclusion of a pact between Rome and
Tirana from Major Lazar Popovski, the Bulgarian chargé d’affaires in Albania
and an IMRO member. Whilst Belgrade remained unconvinced that this
information was credible,58 the Italo–Albanian agreement was announced
on 27 November 1926; it stipulated that Italy would guarantee the “political,
judicial and territorial status quo” in Albania. The so-called First Tirana Pact
went far beyond the Italian pledge to maintain Albania’s territorial integrity
by extending a guarantee to Zogu’s personal regime under the terms of
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which any internal disturbance, real or fabricated, could serve as a pretext for
the landing of Italian forces. Nincˇic´, who banked his whole policy on agree-
ment and friendly relations with Italy, resigned on 7 December. Pašic´ died
three days later, which left Yugoslav foreign policy in a state of uncertainty
at a delicate juncture.
The Tirana Pact produced an era of strained relations between Belgrade
and Rome. The increasing signs of Albania’s submission to Rome radicalised
opinion amongst some Yugoslav officials as to future policy towards Zogu’s
regime and Albania in general. Not surprisingly Dinic´, who had contended
since early 1926 that Zogu had become a pawn of Italy, argued not just
for removing his government but the temporary desertion of “Balkan for
Balkan peoples” policy: having a border with Italy at the Shcumbi River
was less of an evil than having Italy in the whole of Albania.59 The vice-
consul at Corca, Stanoje Simic´, also averred that an independent Albania
was “harmful” and should be liquidated even at the price of suffering from
Italy’s presence “on this side of the Adriatic for she is de facto already on this
side.”60 Interestingly, both men considered the present state of affairs more
detrimental with regards to Albanian irredentism than that which would be
created through the division and the increase of the number of Albanians
within Yugoslav frontiers.
Nincˇic´’s successor, Marinkovic´, sent a personal friend and one of the
ablest Yugoslav diplomats, Milan Rakic´, to the Rome Legation to conduct
negotiations with Mussolini. The foreign minister spelt out the ultimate objec-
tive of the forthcoming talks: “to destroy the Tirana Pact not just in its direct
but also indirect bad consequences for our position in the Balkans and
Central Europe.”61 He was not hopeful about the outcome of Rakic´’s mission
and, therefore, turned his energies towards an alliance with France. He urged
Paris to realise that Italo–Yugoslav conflict was in essence a part of the main
struggle between Italy and France in which Yugoslavia played the role of the
“vanguard of French main forces.”62 If it was not sufficiently supported by
the main forces, the military figure of speech went on, that vanguard could
be broken and forced to capitulate before the decisive battle had started.
Springing from this central consideration for the urgent necessity of a formal
agreement, the impact of the Tirana Pact on the regional political land-
scape received strong emphasis. By forging that instrument, Italy revealed
“her intentions in the Balkans, encouraged all our enemies . . . made our
friends waver and . . . psychologically destroyed peace.”63 Marinkovic´ signed
a friendship treaty with Briand on 11 November 1927. The latter clearly felt
that it was impossible to abandon Yugoslavia in its current difficult posi-
tion vis-à-vis Rome without France losing face and influence in the region
to Italy’s benefit. Still, French restraint was evidenced by a supplementary
secret military protocol that amounted to nothing—the respective General
Staffs would consult about the technical conditions of co-operation should
such collaboration be necessary.64 The Italians were, however, convinced
602 D. Bakic´
that the treaty was accompanied by an ironclad military convention. Such
wrong-headedness stemmed from grossly distorted perceptions that France
was thwarting Italy’s aspirations at every step and “pushing the Serbian mil-
itary class . . . to paroxysms and to dreaming the mad dream of a Greater
Balkans, of the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Sea.”65 Mussolini’s imme-
diate reaction to the Franco–Yugoslav treaty produced a defensive alliance
with Albania on 22 November.
Marinkovic´ used the League gatherings at Geneva to keep negotiations
going with his Italian opposite number, Dino Grandi. Italian preponderance
in Albania remained a stumbling block as Grandi was unwilling to pro-
vide any assurance regarding Italy’s restraint from military intervention and,
moreover, made it abundantly clear that Belgrade would have to choose
between friendship with Paris or Rome.66 At the same time and unknown
to Marinkovic´, his King, Alexander I, exchanged messages with Mussolini
through the intermediary of his Italian decorator, Guido Malagola Cappi, and
expressed his readiness to arrange a personal meeting.67 The king’s negoti-
ations were equally futile despite a willingness to offer substantial political
and economic concessions as long as Yugoslavia could be safe from the
direction of Albania. Nor could it have been otherwise; Mussolini hoped for
the dissolution of Yugoslavia due to the rift between the Serbs and Croats
and actively encouraged the latter to break away from Belgrade.68
It was not before the conclusion of the Pact of Belgrade on 25 March
1937 between the prime minister, Milan Stojadinovic´, and Mussolini’s foreign
minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, that a new atmosphere emerged in Italo–
Yugoslav relations—Zogu had become king of Albania in 1929. It was a
direct consequence of the changing international situation in the 1930s. Nazi
Germany’s threat to Austria’s independence was imminent and Rome was
agitated at the prospect of Hitler’s descent on the Balkans and the Adriatic
despite its friendly relations with Berlin. To counter Nazi expansionism after
an inevitable Austro–German Anschluss, the Italians were willing to reverse
their policy and seek Yugoslavia’s friendship. Furthermore, Ciano thought
that this sweeping diplomatic move would destroy the network of French
alliances and imagined the possibility of Italian influence replacing that of
France.69 Eastern Europe was confronting growing German power, and such
aspirations must have seemed to him more realistic than before given that
France’s decline made its ties with Yugoslavia and other Eastern European
Powers hollow. Yugoslavia had even more reason than Italy to be satis-
fied with the sudden rapprochement, which brought a much needed respite
in the increasingly threatening international situation. It was now relieved
of fascist Italian support for Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism, and the
Italians stopped providing shelter in Italy for the terrorist Croatian Ustaša
organisation—Ustaša members remained in Italy but, instead of being treated
as special guests, they were now placed in internment. The organisation had
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been responsible for the assassination of Alexander I in Marseilles in October
1934.
Throughout the negotiations with Italy and afterwards, Stojadinovic´
maintained that he was strictly adhering to the traditional Yugoslav stand-
point of preserving Albanian independence.70 He informed the minister in
London that as a confidential part of the Pact of Belgrade, an arrange-
ment regarding Albania was reached on the basis of mutual recognition
of its independence.71 Indeed, the secret protocol recorded Italy’s obliga-
tions to end fortification works in Albania that Belgrade had long resented
and “not to seek any special benefits in political, economic or financial
respect which would directly or indirectly compromise the independence
of Albanian state.”72 Such provision met the minimum requirement that
Stojadinovic´ and the Foreign Ministry formulated during the course of nego-
tiations. They looked at this modus vivendi with a view to the future: “The
main thing is that it contains the principles the effective application of which
would have to undermine the current position of Italy in Albania.”73
Stojadinovic´ accepted the view constantly reiterated by Ciano during the
negotiations that Albania had been a major problem in Italo–Yugoslav rela-
tions when the two countries had been hostile to each other; in an entirely
different atmosphere created by their treaty, he declared to Ciano at their first
meeting, the Albanian issue was “an unimportant local problem.”74 Indeed,
it was not mentioned during Stojadinovic´’s return visit to Rome in late 1937;
whilst on the occasion of a third meeting with Ciano in Venice in mid-1938,
he repeated the statement made in Belgrade and did not shy away from
saying that “he recognises that Italy has an absolutely exceptional position
with regard to that state.”75 It was, however, a tactical manoeuvre rather
than acknowledging any real change of policy on the part of the premier.
Reassuring the Tirana Legation regarding Yugoslavia’s “calm and observing
attitude,” Stojadinovic´ opined that given the problem of Albanian irredentism,
“a policy of active friendship with Albania might only make the Albanians
here raise their heads.” Hostility towards Tirana was also unwanted, so little
scope for new initiatives existed. In the final instance, Stojadinovic´ mused,
“the key of Albania is in Rome and with our friendship with Italy which
the Anschluss will only make stronger we also partially hold that key in
our hands.”76 Not surprisingly then, Yugoslavia kept a perfectly loyal attitude
towards the Zogu regime after the Pact of Belgrade. Both the Yugoslav min-
ister and military attaché in Tirana rejected out of hand proposals to support
a plot which involved the murder of Zogu and advised the plotters to work
with him.77 Stojadinovic´ believed that Ciano intended loyally to adhere to
their agreement.
Unfortunately for the Yugoslavs, the idea of annexing Albania was firmly
planted in Ciano’s mind in summer 1937 following his visit to Tirana, if
not before: “We have absorbed several hundred thousand Albanians in the
south. Why could not the same take place on the other side of the Adriatic
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coast?”78 In January 1939, Mussolini and Ciano agreed that Ciano should visit
Belgrade for the express purpose of discussing the Albanian question. The
two had already decided to occupy Albania only if the Yugoslavs agreed
to march with them. The Duce, in particular, was concerned with the effect
that annexation might produce on Yugoslavia—not so much the immediate
reaction, but rather a long-term cooling of relations from which Germany
could be a sole beneficiary. Just before Ciano’s departure, the final decision
was made “that it would not pay to gamble with our precious friendship
with Belgrade to win Albania”; to attain the amicable consent of Yugoslavia,
a fairly generous offer was prepared: “increase at the Yugoslav borders,
demilitarisation of the Albanian borders, military alliance, and the absolute
support of the Serbs in their conquest of Salonica.”79
In the final instance, Stojadinovic´ had to make the best of an extremely
difficult situation. Since Ciano had informed Boško Hristic´, the Yugoslav
minister at Rome, what he wanted to discuss, the prime minister was not
unprepared. “I consulted in advance the Prince Regent [Paul, who had
assumed a regency after Alexander’s assassination], our General Staff and
my assistant in the Foreign Ministry, Ivo Andric´,” Stojadinovic´ wrote in his
memoirs.80 Both Paul and Andric´ considered it best for Yugoslavia that the
Balkan territorial status quo remained unchanged. It was preferable not to
give Ciano a reply. If, however, he proved insistent, it should suffice to take
notice of his proposals and reserve the right to return an answer at some
later point, making an effort to keep the exchange of views friendly and by
no means spoil relations with Italy.81
During the first day of Ciano’s visit on 19 January 1939, Stojadinovic´ took
him for a hunt in the magnificent woods of the Belje estate. Each participant
produced two written records and, by comparative analysis, it is possible
to reconstruct what passed between them. In his diary, Ciano succinctly
noted the reaction produced on his raising the Albanian question: “At first
Stoyadinovich seemed perturbed. Then he broke the ice, and spoke of the
partition of Albania as the best solution.”82 In the official report filed in Rome,
Ciano recounted how he justified the need for action in Albania by its internal
unrest and Zogu’s obscure policy that endangered Italian economic inter-
ests. Having made some contemptuous comments about Zogu, Stojadinovic´
remarked that there were two options: replace the king by someone else,
although he did not know of a suitable candidate, or divide the country
between Italy and Yugoslavia. He claimed that he was not prepared to dis-
cuss the matter since he was not acquainted with the details. Ciano agreed,
adding “it was sufficient to have made contact on the subject.”83
Stojadinovic´’s report to Paul—and his later recollection in his memoirs—
tallies with that of Ciano in all essentials. But according to Stojadinovic´’s
version, he received Ciano’s suggestion with a show of indifference: “As far
as the partition is concerned, I remember it was once a subject of discussion
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some 15 years ago, but we have always considered Albania to be a poor,
uncivilised country which would be a heavy burden to anyone and cause
the expenditure, and no benefits.”84 He also claimed to have tried to deter
Ciano from Albania by pointing out that it was no small matter “to delete
from the geographic map a country which is a member of the League of
Nations and has been a sovereign state for years.”85 Yet, he apparently did
not offer much of resistance. Perhaps he gauged that Italy was determined
to act and that more persistent opposition by Yugoslavia could serve no
other purpose but strain relations between the two Powers and that was
to be avoided at all cost—as had been decided during the consultations
with Prince Paul and Andric´. Thus, he did not fail to remark, “our entrance
into Albania would mean not to let you be there on your own,” whilst he
underscored the importance to Yugoslavia of the stretch of territory including
Shkodra and San Giovanni di Medua.86 Pandering to his ego by making the
official report more flattering of his achievement and more to the Duce’s
liking, Ciano seems likely to have exaggerated Stojadinovic´’s enthusiasm
for the partition. Likewise, he interpreted Paul’s profession that he did not
want more Albanians within Yugoslavia’s frontiers as meaning that he was
“less interested than Stoyadinovitch in the piece of territory to be allotted to
Yugoslavia” rather than opposed to the whole idea.
After Ciano departed, the Foreign Ministry debated what course
Yugoslavia should pursue. Andric´ asserted that the “Balkans to the Balkan
peoples” policy remained the best guarantee for both peace in the penin-
sula and the co-operation and free development of the Balkan Powers. Italy
had not been trusted to restrain itself on the small coastal stretch of Albania
20 years before and could less be trusted to do so under Mussolini’s direction.
Taking a piece of Balkan territory by a non-Balkan Great Power without any
ethnic justification would pose “a dangerous precedent for all Balkan peo-
ples, and us.” All the more so, as a revival of the Italian claim on Albania,
once envisaged in the Treaty of London, would open the door for Italian
demands in Dalmatia on the same basis. Conversely two contingencies had
to be avoided at all costs: a clash with Italy and the Italian occupation of all
of Albania. With this in mind, “the division of Albania, in our view, could be
considered only as a necessary and inevitable evil which cannot be resisted,
and as a great detriment from which one should extract as much benefit
as possible, i.e., choose less of two evils.”87 If the division occurred, Andric´
concluded, Yugoslavia should strive for the frontier along the rivers Mati
and Black Drin, the maximum frontier requested by the late Pašic´, which
would provide for the strategic security of Montenegro and Kosovo. He also
reiterated the old arguments relating to economic advantages and the pos-
sibility of building new transportation links with the Adriatic in case of the
incorporation of Shkodra and northern Albania. Another advantage deriving
from the division of the country would be the disappearance of the focus
for Albanian irredentism and the easier assimilation of the minority living
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in Kosovo. Yugoslavia would absorb another 200,000 to 300,000 Albanians,
but most were Roman Catholics who had never got along with their Moslem
compatriots in Kosovo.
If Andric´ espoused the traditional policy regarding Albania that had
held sway since the Great War, Ivan Vukotic´, a Montenegrin who had been
a general-consul in Shkodra and well-versed into the Albanian situation,
professed that “the incorporation of the northern and parts of central Albania
in our country is one of the vital interests of our people.” To prove his point,
Vukotic´ adduced historical arguments about the constant use of Albanians as
an anti-Serbian tool by the Great Powers. Trying particularly to explain the
errors of the official policy of maintaining Albania’s integrity, Vukotic´ stressed
that contrary to all expectations, that country had become an irredentist
centre for Albanians in Yugoslavia and completely dependent on Italy: “In
such state of affairs it is apparent and clear that it is in our interest to have
Italy get hold of a part rather than the whole of Albania. If there were no
other reasons for the division of Albania, this one would be sufficient.”88
The differences between Andric´’s and Vukotic´’s views were exactly the same
as those between other Yugoslav officials dating back to the 1920s. But
those differences did not matter in relation to a response to Ciano’s offer.
Both analyses concluded that Yugoslavia would be compelled to partake in
Albania’s liquidation if the Italians persisted in their intentions. Whether it
would be done enthusiastically, as Vukotic´ would have it, or with a bitter
taste, as Andric´ contended, was irrelevant.
The military also studied the situation carefully. The Chief of the Great
General Staff, General Dušan Simovic´, advanced his personal opinion that
ran contrary to the long-standing doctrine held in Army headquarters.
A military action “would mostly benefit Italy for we would help her to over-
come Albania’s resistance more rapidly.” Besides, Yugoslavia would obtain
the poorest and most desolate mountainous region with the exception of
Shkodra, populated with the most restless Albanian tribes, the governing
of which would cost a great deal of money and cause political problems.
Simovic´ did not admit that an Italian stronghold in Albania would sig-
nificantly worsen the military position in relation to Italy; Yugoslavia had
always to count on the possibility of an Italian attack from that quarter. This
argument was new and somewhat specious. As if Simovic´ felt so himself,
he endeavoured to provide non-military reasons. From the foreign policy
point of view, he professed, Yugoslavia could not act in the same way as
Italy without detriment to its international standing. Territorial acquisitions in
Albania would likely intensify revisionist demands on the part of Hungary
and Bulgaria. He even discussed internal policy: at the moment when the
Croatian question was on the way towards solution, a military action could
endanger “the survival of the state.” He recommended discreet support of
Albania “so that she lasts as long as possible in the fight against the Italians
both during the Italian occupation and afterwards.”89
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The minister for the Army and Navy, General Milutin Nedic´, was not
impressed with Simovic´’s case. Although accepting the contention that it
would be highly undesirable to act against Albania as an accomplice of
Rome, he pointed out that Yugoslavia had no way of preventing Italy from
occupying that country. With classic strategic appreciation, Nedic´ was con-
vinced that Yugoslavia had to reduce the harmful consequences and perils
from the south as much as possible by extracting certain benefits. Those
were “to decrease the territory which had to come under the governance
of Italy” and “make that territory as far from us as possible in the south-
wards direction and so reduce an effective and direct impact on the peace
and security of our southern parts.” If, however, the burden of preserving
the status quo fell on Yugoslavia’s shoulders, Belgrade would have to find
an arrangement with Italy rather than risk its existence. Such an “undesired
arrangement would just serve us for the purpose of gaining time waiting
for more favourable circumstances when Italy could be removed from the
Balkans.”90 Based on Nedic´’s views, the Great General Staff studied the pos-
sibility of armed intervention in Albania. It could take two forms: take the
eastern part of the country to have the new border as far westwards as possi-
ble and better protect southern Serbia, or prevent the Italians from subduing
Albania with a view to preserving its independence. Both variants, it was
asserted, would lead to an armed clash with Italy, and “through her probably
with Germany too.” Therefore, the division of Albania could be undertaken
“only on the basis of an agreement” with Italy after having delimited spheres
of interests—“although that should not be desired as well.”91 Essentially,
Great General Staff opinion coincided with that of Andric´.
It was Stojadinovic´’s downfall, however, rather than all the analyses of
political and military leadership that had a decisive impact on the shaping
of events. On 4 February 1939, Paul engineered a Cabinet crisis and then
gave a mandate for the premiership to Dragiša Cvetkovic´. The Regent came
to believe that Stojadinovic´ was making some underhanded deals without
his knowledge and to Yugoslavia’s detriment. According to later testimonies
from individuals close to Paul—thus presenting his point of view—he sus-
pected Stojadinovic´ of carrying out the most fantastic plot. It involved the
cession of the western non-Serb parts of Yugoslavia to Italy and the forma-
tion of Greater Serbia including the northern parts of Albania and Salonica
in which Stojadinovic´ would be a fascist dictator.92 In fact, no shred of solid
evidence exists that Stojadinovic´ acted in a disloyal manner in his dealings
with Ciano. On the contrary, the record appears to confirm that he took a
position in accordance with what had been agreed prior to Ciano’s visit and
re-affirmed as the best course of action in the political and military analyses
before and after his demission. He also managed to postpone giving a final
answer and, in doing so, at least bought some time for Belgrade.
If anyone was capable of stalling the Italians or driving a hard bargain
with them, it was Stojadinovic´, who enjoyed the confidence of Mussolini
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and Ciano. In this respect, his downfall immediately proved to be harmful
to Yugoslav interests. When it seemed possible that he might hold on to
power, the Italians decided how to proceed: “With Stoyadinovich, partition
of Albania between us and Yugoslavia; without Stoyadinovich, occupa-
tion of Albania by us without Yugoslavia, and, if necessary, even against
Yugoslavia.”93 When the return of the overthrown prime minister was off the
table, Italian concerns for Yugoslav sensitivity crumbled almost at stroke.
However, Mussolini was concerned that forward policy in Albania might
destroy the fruits of the Pact of Belgrade and see the return of a visceral
anti-Italian feeling in Yugoslavia. In the new situation following the Munich
agreement and the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in mid-March 1939,
the Italians became apprehensive that Germany might oust Italian influence
and actively interfere in Yugoslav affairs, exploiting the internal dissension
between Serbs and Croats. Italian anxiety did not dissipate until the German
ambassador, Hans Georg von Mackensen, returned a suitable assurance re-
enforced by a personal letter from the German foreign minister, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, to Ciano.94
Once satisfied about German intentions, Mussolini proceeded with his
plan. On 7 April 1939, Italian forces descended on the Albanian coast and
occupied the whole country. Days before, the Yugoslav Great General Staff
was preparing plans on Nedic´’s orders for the occupation of Northern
Albania; but they were not, nor could be, completed in the short time
prior to the Italian aggression. Moreover, the operational plans lacked basic
assumptions about the political considerations vis-à-vis Italy in which such
operations would take place and their exact objectives. It was instructive
that the General Staff proposed as much as five different, and successively
smaller, zones of occupation “in case a military-political arrangement comes
to pass between us and Italy.”95 In the event, the Yugoslavs were politically
paralysed and did nothing.
It was not long before Italian military intelligence started spreading pro-
paganda and establishing contacts with prominent Albanians from Kosovo to
prepare the ground for action against Yugoslavia.96 Despite all appearances,
Italian entrenchment in Albania wiped out any remnants of the friendly
relations between the two Powers existing at the time of Stojadinovic´’s pre-
miership. Mussolini would finally get his chance to grab the possessions
of his neighbour under extremely favourable circumstances when Hitler
proceeded to destroy Yugoslavia in April 1941.
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